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Abstract— The use of Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) auction
mechanisms is gaining popularity in the networking community,
where it seems compulsory to incentivize selfish nodes (in ad
hoc networks) or domains (in inter-domain communications) to
forward the traffic of their peers. Indeed, VCG auctions are
known to both be efficient and produce proper incentives.
In this note, we argue that, in fact, VCG auctions can hardly
be applied to those problems, for different reasons depending on
the model studied:
• if some resource constraints (bandwidth, spectrum, and/or
power) have to be taken into account, then computing alloca-
tions and prices implies solving optimization problems that
are computationally hard for general network topologies.
• If there are no such resource constraints, then VCG auc-
tions, even if verifying many important and satisfactory
properties, cannot verify a major one that isbudget balance:
the sum of subsidies given to relay nodes exceeds the sum of
charges paid by traffic senders. This means that the auction
regulator is required to continuously inject money to make
the scheme work, which is unlikely to happen.
In a second step, we discuss the combinations of properties that
can be verified together, and prioritize them for finding out a
proper pricing scheme.
I. I NTRODUCTION
The Internet has become a commercial and competitive
network with many service providers. Those providers need to
exchange traffic to ensure end-to-end delivery, which requir s
peering agreements so that go-between domains accept to for-
ward traffic. Very similar problems occur in ad hoc networks
where nodes, the terminals, are assumed to forward the traffic
of others at the expense of their own battery power.
Pricing appears a promising way to introduce incentives for
forwarding traffic in both of those contexts. Vickrey-Clarke-
Groves (VCG) auctions especially have recently received a lot
of attention since they are known to yield efficient outcomes,
with enjoyable properties such as incentive compatibility,
meaning that players’ best interest is to reveal their true
valuation of the proposed service, or individual rationality,
meaning that players will always benefit from entering the
auction.
Here, we aim at showing that, actually, VCG auctions
are difficult to implement in inter-domain or ad hoc net-
works. While they enjoy the incentive compatibility, individual
rationality, and efficiency properties, they present at least
one prohibitive drawback: either they need a computationally
difficult optimization problem to be solved, or they require
that the auction manager insert money into the game since
the sum of payments from those sending (or receiving) traffic
is always less than the sum of awards distributed to those
forwarding. This last problem is not only verified on the
specific problems of pricing inter-domain and ad hoc networks,
but has been shown in the literature in a general setting,
making it irrelevant to try and get budget balance by modifying
the original models.
This situation of non-balance seems to us likely to deter
from implementation. We therefore further discuss the prope -
ties that a pricing scheme should enjoy, try to prioritize thm,
and look at the possible combinations, in order to provide hints
on the families of pricing schemes that should be dealt with.
Note that this kind of problem has recently received some
attention in the economics community. Indeed, in [1], it is
shown that when preferences are quasi-linear, an incentive
compatible mechanism can be efficient or can balance the
budget, but it cannot do both at the same time. The authors
then characterize a class of budget balanced and incentive
compatible mechanisms, and single out the one with the
smallest welfare loss (based on the Shapley value formula).
They also conversely look at mechanisms which are efficient
and not balanced budget. Though, the context of that work
is slightly different from ours, since their problem consist in
haring the cost of a given service among users, where the cost
is a submodular function of the set of receiving service, and
where users cannot be partially served. The objective functio
is therefore different: there is no allocation rate involved, and
there is no real focus on a network topology.
II. PRINCIPLES AND PROPERTIES OFVCG AUCTIONS
Again, pricing has been seen as a means of interest to
introduce incentives in situations where each new user in-
troduces an added-value to the network capability; interdo-
main routing and ad hoc networks being typical areas of
applications. Indeed, a very basic idea would be for instance
to extend the current Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) to
allow interdomain routing. The extension would consist in
introducing pricing such that each intermediate provider would
receive a financial incentive for accepting to forward packets
of concurrent providers. It is exactly the same problem in ad
hoc networks where forwarding packets of neighbors is at the
expense of limited battery capacities, and therefore needsto be
compensated in some way. VCG auctions have been regarded
as one of the most prevalent ways to introduce those rewarding
issues. In all those applications, each player (a domain in case
of interdomain routing or a node of the ad hoc network) tries to
maximize its own benefits, that is the valuation for sending its
own traffic (depending on the volume of traffic he sends), plus
the amount of money gained from the forwarded traffic, minus
the cost of sending traffic (financial cost plus engineering cost,
in terms of battery for instance).
Vickrey-Clarke-Groves auctions [2], [3], [4] apply to any
problem where players (users) have aquasi-linear utility
function. This means that the utilityUi of each useri depends
on the outcome (say, the resource allocation vector)a and on
the priceci he is charged (notice thatci can be non-positive
when i is subsidized), and can be written
Ui(a, ci) = θi(a) − ci,
whereθi is called thevaluationor willingness-to-payfunction
of useri.
VCG auctions work as follows:
1) each user is asked to reveal his valuation function (let
us denote bỹθi the function declared by useri with real
valuation functionθi);
2) the mechanism computes an outcomea(θ̃) that maxi-
mizes the declared social welfare1:
a(θ̃) ∈ arg max
x
∑
i
θ̃i(x); (1)
3) the price paid by each user corresponds to the loss of
declared welfare he imposes to the others through his
presence:
ci = max
x
∑
j 6=i
θ̃j(x) −
∑
j 6=i
θ̃j(a(θ̃)). (2)
Then the mechanism verifies three major properties:
• Incentive compatibility: for each user, bidding truthfully
(i.e. declaringθ̃i = θi) is a dominant strategy.
• Individual rationality: each truthful player obtains a non-
negative utility.
• Efficiency: when players bid truthfully, social welfare
(
∑
i θi) is maximized.
III. VCG AUCTIONS IN INTER-DOMAIN OR AD HOC
NETWORKS
In networks, the form of each agenti’s valuation function
θi can be precised:
• traffic initiators (senders) are accepting to pay up to
a threshold to obtain a given transmission rate from
one point to another: therefore their valuation function
depends only on their own resource allocation. Depending
1The maximization is over the set of feasible outcomes, that may belimit d
by resource constraints.
on the type of flow, the individual demand of a sender
can be elastic (that is tolerant to variations in the obtained
service) or inelastic (that is with strict requirements).
• Intermediate nodes or domains have a negative valuation
function, that reflects their perceived costs for transferring
traffic. Generally, those costs depend on the total amount
of traffic that has to be transferred, or (in ad hoc networks
using power control) on the total power needed to transfer
that traffic.
The goals of introducing VCG auctions in inter-domain or
ad hoc networks is to obtain an efficient routing (by enforcing
cooperation) and to incentivize participation for transferring
traffic. The rules are designed such that the senders (or
receivers) pay for the traffic that is carried and the intermediat
nodes are subsidized for transferring traffic, compensating
their transmission costs. The amount to be awarded is defined
by the specific pricing rule (2) employed.
In the following, we argue that VCG auctions applied to
such networks present at least one prohibitive drawback, large
computational complexity and/or negative budget balance,de-
pending on whether resource constraints are taken into account
when determining the outcome.
A. Networks with resource constraints: VCG and computa-
tional complexity
When communication links are not overdimensioned (which
is particularly true in ad hoc networks where the transmission
rates are limited by the radio spectrum, and where interference
degrades even more those transmission rates), it may not be
possible to satisfy all requests because of congestion. VCG
auctions in such contexts would then serve at the same time
(i) as an incentive for intermediate nodes to transfer traffic, and
(ii) as a rule for selecting the accepted and rejected requests.
Following VCG principles, each potential sender declares
his willingness-to-pay function, and each potential interm di-
ate node (i.e. each node, since all node are likely to transfer
traffic) declares his cost function. Then allocations are com-
puted in order to maximize the sum of declared valuations
(social welfare), that is the sum of prices senders are willing
to pay minus the sum of transfer costs (by summing over all
senders and intermediate nodes). However, a problem due to
the complexity of that computation appears when the set of
possible allocations is constrained by resource bounds. More
precisely, determining in general the most efficient allocati n
is a NP-hard problem. As an example, consider a very simple
model with only one intermediate node, sayA, that cannot
transfer more than a given amountQ of traffic, andN potential
senders with inelastic demand that need the help ofA to reach
their destination, as represented in Figure 1. The valuation
functionθi of each potential senderi with non-elastic demand
is θi(ai) = βi1lai≥αi , which means that senderi is willing to
payβi if he is allocated at leastαi, and0 otherwise. Then, even
if the transferring cost forA is null, maximizing the social
welfare
∑
i θi(ai) under the constraint
∑
i ai ≤ Q resumes to
solving the knapsack problem, which is known to be NP-hard
[5].
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Fig. 1. Allocation problem in case of congestion
In the above example, NP-hardness comes from the inelas-
ticity of demands. For elastic demands, determining the most
efficient allocation through both routing and allocations is also
NP-hard for non-trivial network topologies when routes have
to be single-path [6].
To emphasize on the complexity problems that stem from
the application of VCG auctions in networks with capacity
constraints, remember that the computation of the price paid
(resp. the subsidy received) by each sender (resp. interme-
diate) needs another optimization problem to be solved (see
Equation (2)). Applying VCG auctions withN users therefore
implies N + 1 optimization problems to be solved: those
problems must be computationally simple enough.
B. Transfer costs with no resource constraints: VCG and
budget balance
Some networks can be dimensioned such that congestion
never occurs. This might be the case for example in core
networks, that use the latest technologies and allow high
communication rates. It can therefore be assumed that inter-
domain routing never introduces new constraints due to re-
source limits. The transfer costs for an intermediate domain
are then modelled as being proportional to the amount of traffic
to transfer.
Vickrey-Clarke-Groves auctions seem consequently well-
suited to this context, since a request has no effect on another
one, and maximizing the overall social welfare can then be
done by performing independently a least-cost path search
for each request, removing the complexity issue of previous
subsection.
This kind of model is assumed in [7], [8], where VCG
auctions are used to produce the incentives to transfer traffic.
The model consists ofn domains (or autonomous systems),
numbered from1 to n. Inter-domain routing is handled by
a simple modification of the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP)
[7]. It is assumed that the amount of traffic isTij from domain
i to domainj, and that the per-packet transit cost isck for
domaink (1 ≤ k ≤ n). Valuation of intermediate domaink
for a given allocation (here, a routing decision) is thus
θk(routing) = −ck
∑
{(i,j) routed troughk}
Tij . (3)
Each domain is asked to declare its transit costk, and the least
(declared) cost routepath(i, j) is computed for each origin-
destination pair(i, j). Since there are no resource constraint,
those routes minimize the total (declared) cost
∑
i,j
Tij
∑
k∈path(i,j)
ck,
which amounts to the maximization problem (1) when using
(3). Equivalently, the computation of VCG subsidies for each
domaink can be done per each origin-destination pair(i, j),
by applying the pricing rule (2) to the problem of routing only
the traffic fromi to j. Those subsidies ensure thatintermediate
domains, acting selfishly, truthfully reveal their transfer costs,
and therefore that the routing is efficient.
Nevertheless, one question not addressed in [7], [8] is: who
pays the subsidies? It is natural to think that the origin2 should
pay them, but would that be suitable if the sum of subsidies
equals10$ while the sender is willing to pay only1$ for his
traffic to reach destination?
Actually, an efficient scheme should take into account the
willingness-to-pay of the traffic sender to determinewhether
it is socially optimal for that traffic to be carried (which is
th case if and only if the sender valuation for the traffic
exceeds the sum of tranfer costs of the intermediate domains).
VCG auctions fit perfectly with that case: just consider the
traffic sender as a player that is asked to declare the maximum
price he is willing to pay. Then because of social welfare
maximization (1), that traffic will only be sent if it socially
profitable, and the pricing rule (2) will determine a price topay
f r the sender such that truthfully declaring his willingness-
to-pay is a dominant strategy.
The same kind of model is presented by Anderegg and Ei-
denbenz [9] for incentivizing cooperation in ad hoc networks,
with the same drawbacks as in [7], [8]. Basically, transfer
costs depend here on the minimum power required to reach the
next neighbour. The model therefore generalizes the one in [7]
by associating several costs to each node, one per neighbour,
instead of just one. The analysis and results are identical
though. The sender’s willingness-to-pay is (again) not taken
into account, but it is assumed that the sender should pay the
total declared transfer cost. Though, for a VCG auction where
both intermediates and senders are treated as selfish players,
the VCG price that the sender should pay according to (2)
is the sum of declared costs if the traffic is effectively sent.
However, as highlighted in [9], this price isalways below
the sum of subsidies. That problem of non budget balance is
defined as theoverpayment; a relative bound with respect to
what is paid is provided. The balance of the mechanism is
therefore always negative, which means that money has to be
inserted to make the scheme work.
The model in [9] is modified by Eidenbenzet al in [10]:
subsidies are still computed according to (2), but the sender is
charged the total declared cost of a “second least-cost path”,
i.e. the least-cost path with all nodes in the cost-efficientpath
2Or the termination for some applications like file downloading. Since those
considerations do not change the reasoning, we assume in the following that
the traffic sender is charged.
removed3, if that charge is below his declared willingness-to-
pay. The authors argue that such charges are closer to the sum
of subsidies than VCG charges, and that the receiver should
compensate the difference to reach budget balance (from
which the scheme is closer). The scheme is also shown to
be incentive compatible. Nevertheless, that mechanism is not
efficient anymore, since situations may occur where a request
is rejected whereas it would maximize social welfare (this
is the case when the sender’s valuation is between the total
costs of the first and the second least-cost paths). Therefor,
introducing budget balance results here in a loss of efficiency.
In the next subsection, we review general results about
auctions that give some hints about the properties we can
expect from a properly designed mechanism.
C. General results on auctions
Green and Laffont [11] establish that when players have
quasi-linear utility functions, every allocation and pricing
mechanism that is simultaneouslyefficientand incentive com-
patible is a Groves mechanism, VCG auctions being a partic-
ular case of them.
More recently, Krishna and Perry [12] prove that among the
mechanisms that are efficient, Bayesian incentive compatible4,
and Bayesian individually rational, VCG prices maximize th
expected price paid by each agent (that can be negative). Since
incentive compatibility (resp. individual rationality) respec-
tively imply Bayesian incentive compatibility (resp. individual
rationality), VCG auctions minimize the overpayment (always
existing without capacity constraints; otherwise, it may amount
to maximizing the benefits, if any) among the schemes that
verify the three properties: incentive compatibility, indivi ual
raionality and efficiency. The fact that the introduction of
capacity constraints may result in no overpayment stems from
the appearance of congestion charges for the sender that can
overtake the overpayment.
Therefore, for a network without resource constraints as
studied in subsection III-B, the negative balance of VCG
auctions imply that the four properties
• incentive compatibility,
• efficiency,
• individual rationality,
• budget balance,
cannot hold simultaneously.
3For that price to be defined, the authors assume that every pair(s, t)
of nodes is 2-connected, meaning that there exist two node-disjoint paths
connecting(s, t).
4In [12], Krishna and Perry take a Bayesian approach: they consider
that valuation functions are distributed according to a given probability
distribution, and that each player, knowing his own valuation, derives a
conditional distribution on the valuation of the others. Bayesian incentive
compatibility means here that playing truthfully ensures each player to
maximize his expected utility conditionally on his valuation. Moreover, the
scheme is Bayesian individually rational if that conditional expected utility is
non-negative.
IV. D ISCUSSION: WHICH COMBINATION OF PROPERTIES TO
PREFER?
This paper focused on the applicability of VCG auctions
in inter-domain and ad hoc networks. We have exhibited
prohibitive disadvantages of that scheme, related to the com-
putational complexity involved and/or the financial cost ofhe
mechanism.
Consequently, a pricing scheme adapted to that context must
relax at least one of the four properties given in subsectionIII-
C. It seems to us that budget balance cannot be relaxed, since
such a mechanism would not be economically viable. Second,
we think that individual rationality is also compulsory: user
may be unwilling to risk having a negative utility and would
perceive the scheme badly. Moreover, the revelation principle
[13] states that the outcome of any auction game is reachable
by an incentive compatible mechanism, which implies that
incentive compatibility is always reachable.
The only property that remains to be relaxed is efficiency
(notice that this property is relaxed in [10], but budget balance
is not assured either in that work). However, it is still desirable
that the allocation remain close to the social optimum, thusa
direction for future work in that context could be to design a
scheme with bounded inefficiency.
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